America's rabbis currently structure their employment market with rules that flagrantly violate the Sherman Act. The consequences of these rules, in addition to the predictable economic outcomes of inflated wages for rabbis and restricted consumer freedoms for the congregations that employ them, meaningfully hinder Jewish communities from seeking their preferred spiritual leader.
I. Introduction
In Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, the Supreme Court put to rest the notion that selfdescribed "learned professionals" were exempt from the nation's antitrust laws. Rejecting the defendant bar association's claim that "competition is inconsistent with the practice of a profession because enhancing profit is not the goal of professional activities; the goal is to provide services necessary to the community," the Court warned that carving out such an exemption would empower professionals "to adopt anticompetitive practices with impunity." Despite Goldfarb's grave warning against the potential harm from permitting professionals to engage in anticompetitive collusion, there remain professionals who-in violation of the Sherman Act-painstakingly construct industry rules to secure for themselves a captive market that is subject to exploitation and control. And despite Goldfarb's sweeping charge to enforce the Sherman Act widely, those professions continue to claim to be exempted from antitrust scrutiny. But instead of invoking a so-called "learned professionals exemption" to the Sherman Act, they instead hide behind the First Amendment. And in doing so, they pervert the First Amendment, invoking it as a license to suppress the very religious expression the Amendment is designed to protect.
The professionals at issue are America's rabbis, who currently organize cartels that control their placement across the nation. When a synagogue needs to hire a pulpit rabbi, it is confronted with tightly controlled professional organizations with strict placement rules. Those rules require both rabbis seeking employment and congregations hoping to hire a pulpit rabbi to exclusively use designated placement offices run by the rabbinical associations. These ruleswhich are enforced through punishments to both rabbis and congregations that act independently-prohibit rabbis and congregations from communicating directly and seeking preferred matches through multiple media. The rules thus severely limit the supply of rabbis available to hiring congregations and prevent both rabbis and congregations from enjoying the benefits of an open labor market. They also meaningfully interfere with a congregation's ability to deliberate fully over whom to interview, pursue, and select to be its religious leader of choice.
In short, these tight restraints on employment convert the rabbinic organizations into professional cartels that simultaneously restrain the operation of a potentially competitive labor market and prevent congregations from freely expressing their religious practices and beliefs.
Such economic coercion would normally be a textbook Sherman Act violation.
Moreover, subjugation of a religious community from pursuing its preferred form of religious practice would be thought to encroach upon the essence of what the First Amendment is supposed to protect. Yet the First Amendment cannot act as a sword for congregations, thus exposing to one of the great limitations of the First Amendment: although the Free Exercise Clause can prohibit government coercion or intrusion on religious expression, it does nothing to protect communities from similar intrusion or regulation on the part of religious co-leaders. The Sherman Act, however, does endow parties injured by anticompetitive conduct with private causes of action and therefore can protect these communities from the religious and economic bullying by the rabbinic organizations.
Yet, in an illustration of the First Amendment's double-edges, the Amendment's Free
Exercise not fails to protect congregations from their movement's leaders, but the Amendment's Establishment Clause might sanitize the very subjugation those leaders impose. Because the Establishment Clause protects religious groups against certain enforcement actions by the state, any legal action against these rabbinic organizations-even if such an action was intended to promote religious expression-also must conform to the First Amendment. Therefore, if the Sherman Act were to compensate for the failure of the Free Exercise Clause to protect community synagogues, it must also jump through the hoops set by the Establishment Clause.
This essay explores this interesting-and important-intersection between the Sherman
Act and the First Amendment's religious protections. It focuses on the labor market for pulpit rabbis, in which national rabbinic associations impose rules upon both their members and hiring congregations that deny basic economic freedoms. These freedoms are normally protected by the Sherman Act and, I argue, should be so protected, not only to secure for congregations the benefits of market choice, fair competition, and protection against economic exploitation, but also to secure their religious liberties. After detailing the rabbinic labor market and placement policies, the essay offers an antitrust analysis of the underlying restraints, a constitutional analysis of alleged First Amendment protections, and a normative analysis of how proper application of the Sherman Act would liberate both the American rabbinate and American Judaism. The central argument is quite simple: both the Sherman Act and the First Amendment are intended to protect the populous from entrenched power, one against economic concentration and the other against the concentration of religious authority. When entrenched economic power is religious in nature, the Sherman Act and First Amendment should act in concert, rather than at odds with one another.
II. The Rabbi Cartels
Most synagogues in the United States belong to one of four movements: Orthodox, Conservative, Reform, and Reconstructionist. The three non-Orthodox movements-the focus of this essay-vary significantly in their theologies and the practices they encourage their member synagogues to adopt, but they are distinct from Orthodox communities (which themselves vary widely) in their adoption of egalitarian gender roles and alteration of religious law and practices to conform to post-Enlightenment values. members. Each of the three non-Orthodox rabbinical associations organize placement under similar (and, as will be shown, similarly illegal) rules and are thus subject to the same legal analysis. For the purposes of illustration, the Conservative Movement's Rabbinical Association will be described in detail and will serve as the object of legal analysis.
The RA considers its administration of the Joint Placement Commission as one of its most central responsibilities. 4 Charged with the responsibility of connecting RA members seeking employment with congregations searching to hire a pulpit rabbi, the Joint Placement Commission organizes the job market for rabbis seeking employment at Conservative congregations and is the only recognized body with the authority to place rabbis in the Conservative Movement. Only RA members are entitled to utilize the Commission's placement process, and RA members are required to seek employment as congregational rabbis exclusively through the RA's Commission.
The Placement Commission makes available its database of RA rabbinic candidates only to "congregation[s] in good standing of the Conservative movement." 5 A congregation choosing to enlist in the RA's placement process, however, is subject to explicit conditions. The RA's placement manual for congregations, Aliyah, "highlights" these restrictions in bullet form:  A congregation may search for a rabbi only through the offices of the Placement Commission. Eligible candidates are those whose resumes are forwarded by the Placement Commission.  A congregation served by the Commission shall not advertise in the media for a rabbi. If a congregation advertises, it will be removed from the Placement List.

If a congregation interviews a non-Rabbinical Assembly rabbi without the specific written approval of the Commission, the congregation will be removed from the Placement List.
If a congregation engages a non-Rabbinical Assembly rabbi without the specific written approval of the Commission, the congregation will lose placement privileges for at least a year the next time it seeks a rabbi. Other consequences may apply. Similar rules apply to rabbinic candidates as well. 6 Consequently, Conservative congregations seeking to find a Conservative rabbi are confronted with what amounts to a Hobson's choice: either the congregation seeks rabbinic candidates exclusively through the RA or it is foreclosed from RA candidates altogether.
The RA's rules pose an even more meaningful threat to its own members (hinted at in the lattermost bullet, referencing "similar rules" to rabbinic candidates). RA members who seek employment through alternative mechanisms-whether in addition to or instead of the RA Placement Commission-will be punished by the Association, including being excluded from using the RA placement processes for an extended period. This applies even for happenstance matches, in which a Conservative congregation was introduced to a particular rabbi outside the RA placement process and developed a strong desire to employ him/her (and that same rabbi has a strong desire to be hired by that congregation). Both that congregation and the rabbi seeking Conservative rabbis, but they also constitute the vast share of the market for pulpit rabbis hired by Conservative synagogues. By controlling access to that market, RA leaders create and control the bottleneck to a Conservative congregation's pool of potential leaders.
III. Rabbinic Cartels and Illegal Practices

B. The Rabbinical Assembly's Illegal Group Boycott
The RA is a professional association that requires all of its members to participate exclusively in its search process. Although the RA seeks to advance the professional interests of its members, each member rabbi is nonetheless a potential or actual competitor with each other.
RA rabbis compete for available jobs, and their effective supply is inversely correlated to their wages. Although RA members might they share professional and ideological goals, and although they frequently collaborate to advance the interests of their movement and the larger Jewish community, they are undeniably competitors within a defined labor market.
Accordingly, the Sherman Act prohibits collaborations among these competitors that lessen competition. Although the Sherman Act surely would permit the RA to act as a central clearinghouse of resumes and hiring congregations-a procompetitive venture that would bring benefits to congregations, RA members, and the entire labor market-the placement process the RA organizes imposes severe limitations on how rabbis can market themselves and how congregations can seek their ideal rabbinic leader. Equally meaningfully, the RA enforces these rules by exacting penalties on non-conforming rabbis and congregations, including the threat of expelling rabbis from the RA if they transgress rules on placement. 12 Because the RA requires participating Conservative synagogues to enroll exclusively in the RA placement process, rabbis excluded from the RA are shut out of the hiring market and Conservative synagogues that seek to hire rabbis through separate avenues are excluded from the RA's supply of available rabbis. In short, in abiding by the rules of RA membership, RA members are collectively agreeing both to exclude congregations who search for rabbis through multiple mechanisms and to boycott any rabbi who seeks employment independently.
This amounts to what is colloquially described in antitrust parlance as a group boycott.
Group boycotts are horizontal agreements among competitors to refuse to deal with certain disfavored groups or individuals. 13 Such restraints "have long been held to be in the forbidden category" 14 under Section 1 and are one of the categories of restraints that the Supreme Court has found to be per se illegal. 15 Group boycotts triggering per se illegality generally involve "joint efforts . . . to disadvantage competitors by either directly denying or persuading or coercing suppliers or customers to deny the relationships the competitors need in the competitive struggle." 16 When concerted refusals to deal cannot be "justified by plausible arguments that they were intended to enhance overall efficiency and make markets more competitive … the Second, the RA limits competition among rabbis seeking employment. Although professional organizations have previously argued that competition among their members is not in the public interest, the Supreme Court has soundly responded that "[t]he heart of our national economic policy long has been faith in the value of competition," 21 and that "the statutory policy precludes inquiry into the question whether competition is good or bad. 22 Accordingly, a professional association that interferes with competition among its members and "imposes [its] views of the costs and benefits of competition on the entire marketplace" violates the Sherman Act's core principle.
The RA's rules on placement commit this cardinal transgression by limiting competition in the labor market for pulpit rabbis. Because the RA membership rules require members to seek employment exclusively through its search process, and because RA search rules require congregations to exclusively enroll in their search process, there is no meaningful employment competition between RA rabbis and non-RA rabbis. Before being able to compare rabbis on individual merits or qualities, congregations must make a foundational and rather conceptual decision about the movement in which it will search. This significantly limits individualized comparisons and thus reduces inter-denominational competition between rabbis for employment.
The RA placement rules also limit intra-denominational competition because the RA Placement
Commission filters the candidates that congregations may interview.
Of course, the RA's restrictions do not stifle competition among congregations who seek to hire particular rabbis, and many rabbis are remunerated handsomely because of intense competition among congregations. By limiting competition among rabbis for employment and requiring synagogues to search exclusively through their own process, the RA significantly enhances this competition among congregations, thus inflating the wages of its own members. A recent study discovered that rabbis earn significantly more-upwards to two-to-three times more-than Catholic priests and Protestant ministers. Third, the RA placement rules impose entry barriers for graduates of new seminaries, and thus limits competition both between the RA and other rabbinical associations as well as between the Conservative seminaries and other seminaries. Graduates of independent seminaries, such as the Hebrew College, that seek employment in Conservative synagogues are foreclosed from the main pathway to find congregations looking to hire rabbis. They may enhance their employment prospects by joining the RA, but obtaining membership is difficult, often subject to discretionary standards, and imposes an ideological litmus tests.
The difficulty in finding employment for graduates of these alternative seminaries not only cements the RA's control over the market for rabbis in Conservative synagogues, but it provides an anticompetitive advantage for graduates of Conservative seminaries. This reduces the ability of independent seminaries to assure their graduates access to a fair labor market and challenge Conservative seminaries for the best students and faculty. Conservative Jews worldwide (and maybe even Conservative Judaism itself) are harmed when competition between seminaries is restricted and when mainstream religious leaders and religious institutions maintain entrenched supremacy through anticompetitive restraints rather than competing on intellectual and spiritual merits. This is precisely the competitive harm that the antitrust laws are designed to prevent. The Supreme Court has warned that concerted refusals to deal can limit entry and harm smaller or independent competitors, 24 and such a "constriction of supply is the essence of `price-fixing,'
whether it be accomplished by agreeing upon a price, which will decrease the quantity demanded, or by agreeing upon an output, which will increase the price offered." 25 For this reason, the Supreme Court "has long held that certain concerted refusals to deal or group boycotts are so likely to restrict competition without any offsetting efficiency gains that they should be condemned." 26 The RA's concerted refusals surrounding its placement processes are conduct squarely condemned by the Supreme Court and are paradigmatic Sherman Act violations.
C. A Boycott without Efficiency or Expressive Defenses
A group boycott, even one that "imped[es] the ordinary give and take of the market place," is permitted under the Sherman Act if its legally cognizable merits outweigh its anticompetitive harm. 27 The RA could claim two justifications to defend its restraints, one related to promoting quality and the other related to promoting expression. Quality improvement is a procompetitive justification recognized by antitrust law, and a restraint might withstand antitrust scrutiny if its purported quality improvements outweigh any inefficiencies the restraint otherwise creates. 28 Additionally, because the RA is a religious association, it could invoke a line of cases in which courts permitted "expressive boycotts" under the Sherman Act because the concerted action in question was more expressive than economic. However, neither of these justifications protects the RA's restraints from antitrust liability.
A Tired Argument on Expertise and Quality
The RA has argued that a rabbi's job, and therefore the rabbinic job placement process, involves unique and complex features that justify unusual control and intervention in the labor market. Specifically, it has claimed that rabbis "live and work under unusual and often exceptionally challenging stresses that derive from the multivalent nature of the relationship of This is a species of a market failure argument, in which a restraint is justified as achieving a superior market outcome. The current placement process, the RA claims, "lends a long-term view to placement, an exceptionally complex process of matching spiritual leaders to the dynamic and diverse systems that are congregations." 30 The RA thus argues that it is in a unique position of expertise to design a placement system that best suits the needs of rabbis and congregations alike. 31 An open labor market, the argument suggests, would not work as well in these circumstances.
This market-failure argument echoes those made by physicians, engineers, and other professionals who previously requested immunity from the Sherman Act. These professional associations, like the RA, claimed that the nature of their profession required rules of selfgovernance, even when such rules controlled output and restrained consumer choice. The Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected these arguments.
First, as a general matter, the Supreme Court has not accepted arguments suggesting that restraints on competition are consistent with the Sherman Act. In rejecting arguments from engineers that restraints on competition would improve quality, the Court held that the Sherman Act "reflects a legislative judgment that ultimately competition will produce not only lower 29 Gilah Dror & Julie Schonfeld, Statement About The Placement System, RA NEWS ALERT (October 2010) ("[I]t could not be clearer to the RA that rabbis and their families live and work under unusual and often exceptionally challenging stresses that derive from the multivalent nature of the relationship of rabbis to their synagogues. As a result, a system that attempts to address these unique professional challenges, and thereby encourages talented individuals to enter and remain in the profession despite those challenges, benefits not only rabbis and their families but the Jewish community as a whole") 30 Id. 31 Id.
prices, but also better goods and services." 32 In rejecting similar arguments from attorneys, the Court emphasized that the statute "precludes inquiry into the question whether competition is good or bad." 33 The Court will be similarly skeptical of the RA's claims that their tight control of the labor market for rabbis improves quality outcomes.
34
Accordingly, a restraint must enhance competition in order to survive Sherman Act scrutiny. The RA presumably claims that the exceptionalism of rabbinic services requires the RA to restrain the hiring market, perhaps because congregations are incapable of taking "a longterm view to placement" or of handling the "exceptionally complex process" that involves hiring a rabbi. The RA cannot, however, justify its restraint on paternalist grounds and instead must explain why its intervention advances competition. Professional associations have previously argued that restraints on competition were justified because they protected consumers from a market's complexity and exceptionalism, but the Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected such arguments. In response to engineers, the Court stated "the argument that because of the special characteristics of a particular industry, monopolistic arrangements will better promote commerce demise of several. 42 The Sherman Act requires that competitive forces, not monopolistic restraints, attract entry into a labor market. Provider-sponsored restraints push supply and wages above competitive levels, to the disadvantage of consumers and to the detriment of social welfare.
A Restraint without Defensible Expression
Sherman Act case law involving "expressive boycotts" acknowledges the noneconomic features of certain expressive restraints, and the antitrust analysis in such cases involves more than a simple balancing of efficiencies. However, recognizing that "every concerted refusal to do business with a potential customer or supplier has an expressive component," and refusing to "create a gaping hole" in antitrust law by excepting expressive boycotts from Sherman Act scrutiny, 43 the Supreme Court has been vigilant in subjecting even expressive boycotts to antitrust law. an independent publisher brought an antitrust action against the Catholic Church after the Church issued a memorandum to booksellers, requesting that they refrain from distributing the plaintiff's prayer book-which the Church described as an unapproved translation-and instead distribute one published by a division of the Church. 53 The court rejected the Church's claim of a First Amendment exemption from the antitrust laws, holding that a religious organization is not immune from antitrust scrutiny simply because its actions are religiously motivated. To the contrary, a religious institution is fully subject to the Sherman Act when its actions are designed to secure its "survival in the marketplace."
54
Although there is little case law subjecting religious organizations to the Sherman Act,
Rotelle is consistent with the standard laid out in SCTLA. Both cases fully subject religious and expressive organizations to the Sherman Act, and although application of the Sherman Act takes into consideration the expressive or religious nature of the underlying conduct, economic conduct that inflicts substantial harm to competition is subject to standard Sherman Act scrutiny.
Accordingly, in evaluating any of the RA's religious or expressive justifications for its restrictive placement system, a reviewing court will duly note the substantial harm to competition the RA's restraints cause. A court will also note that many of the RA's placement rules clearly serve to protect the economic well-being of RA members, including rules that punish congregations from employing alternative search processes and rules that prohibit congregations from hiring "transitional rabbis" or rabbis with less congregational experience 51 Costello Pub. Co. v. Rotelle, 670 F.2d 1035 (1981). 52 Id. at 1049. 53 Id. at 1040-41. 54 Id. at 1049.
than the RA deems acceptable for certain positions. These rules, which are often in tension with the mutual desires of both congregations and individual rabbinical applicants, reward loyal RA members with continued employment and enhanced bargaining power. They also disadvantage alternative rabbinical associations and depress demand for non-RA rabbis. Perhaps most pernicious, these restrictive rules empower RA leadership to maintain a strong measure of internal control, punishing deviating RA members and insulating themselves from competitive threats. They do not serve religious purposes, and they are not necessary to guide or advise congregations in their search to hire a talented pulpit rabbi.
Since these rules accrue such economic benefit to RA members, application of SCTLA and Rotelle would obviate an inquiry into the religious purposes underlying the restraints.
Viewing the RA's placement process through the lens of SCTLA reveals that the system is designed to maximize control over the labor market while squelching the independence of both member rabbis and congregations. The restraints contain little, if any, expression, and no restraint is necessary to achieve a particular expressive belief. Thus, antitrust case law convincingly establishes that the RA's rules amount to a group boycott, that RA restraints hinder market competition and frustrate participants, and the RA is in violation of the Sherman Act.
IV. Religious Protections and the Sherman Act
The accusation that the Rabbinical Assembly's placement practices are in violation of the A. The Free Exercise Clause, Smith, and the Sherman Act's Neutrality.
Although the language of the First Amendment's guarantee that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof" is notoriously terse, the Supreme Court has long held that its guarantees of religious freedoms are not absolute. 58 The First Amendment has been interpreted to ensure near-absolute protection of (1) it is a neutral law of general applicability and (2) it is not specifically directed at a particular religious behavior or motivated by a desire to interfere with religion. 63 Neutral laws that burden religion, without any explicit or pretextual intent to target particular religious conduct, do not violate the Constitution. 64 The Sherman Act is plainly a neutral and generally applicable law that prohibits conduct that Congress is empowered to regulate. 65 Moreover, the Sherman Act is both neutral and generally applicable insofar as it applies to all industries and groups. 66 The Sherman Act would therefore pass the first prong of the test from Smith.
Additionally, the Sherman Act was not passed with any Congressional intent to target religious groups or religious practice. Although scholars debate Congress' precise motivations underlying the Sherman Act, none have contended that Congress enacted it with a specific goal to burden religion. 67 If anything, Congress' focus was on ending the anticompetitive behavior of secular entities such as the trusts that dominated the industrial economy at the time. Assembly's placement practices.
RFRA's Gaping Hole
In City of Boerne v. Flores, the Supreme Court ruled that RFRA was unconstitutional as applied to laws made by state and local governments. 93 The Court held that while Section V of the Fourteenth Amendment empowers Congress to "enforce" the Fourteenth Amendment, that enforcement power is limited to enacting legislation that "is only preventive or remedial" of constitutional violations. 94 The Court ruled that Congress exceeded its Section V authority in passing RFRA because the statute lacked "proportionality or congruence between the means adopted and the legitimate end to be achieved." 95 hold that on substantive issues federal case law should be regarded as precedential." 97 Although
Congress, through RFRA, might have curtailed application of federal antitrust laws, it has no authority to limit state antitrust laws, which by and large are substantively equivalent.
98
In the wake of the City of Boerne ruling, sixteen states also enacted so-called "mini-
RFRA" laws to reinstate pre-Smith protections of religious conduct against their own laws.
99
Therefore, just as RFRA could be read as a limitation of the Sherman Act, mini-RFRAs might similarly limit some corresponding state antitrust statutes. In these sixteen "mini-RFRA states," application of the antitrust laws is subject to pre-Smith protections. In the thirty-four states without mini-RFRA statutes, however, there is no such limitation. Therefore, even if RFRA and mini-RFRAs are broadly interpreted to limit applying competition laws to the conduct of religious organizations, they still do not limit the application of state antitrust laws in these thirty-four states.
C. The Establishment Clause, Entanglement, and Intra-Denominational Disputes
Courts are appropriately leery of entering into ecclesiastical disputes. When confronted with a legal dispute that requires the dissection and interpretation of religious or doctrinal authority, any court intervention or ruling amounts to an endorsement of a particular religious position and thus runs afoul of the Establishment Clause (it might also transgress the Free Exercise Clause, since the ruling infringes on the losing party's expression does not require adherence to the RA placement policies). 108 But being a member of USCJ does not place the congregation under USCJ's authority. A Conservative-affiliated synagogue might also, but does not have to, hire a rabbi who is a member of the Rabbinical Assembly, but that rabbi is an employee of the congregation. Although the rabbi might be obligated to adhere to the Rabbinical Assembly's code of conduct, the congregation is not subject to the RA's authority whatsoever.
In short, the relationships a Conservative synagogue has with USCJ and the RA-and indeed the relationship any American synagogue has with the national institutions that organize the respective movements-is entirely voluntary. While a congregation might enter into a contractual relationship with a national rabbinic organization (for rabbinic placement) or an association of synagogues (for affiliation), the source of the legal authority in those relationships are based, like all contracts, on mutual assent. This is no accident, but rather is central to the American Jewish experience-indeed, central to the Jewish Diaspora experience, which has for two millennia created the Judaism we now know. Synagogues are to be creations of their respective communities, and the imposition of external authorities or the denial of community autonomy is antithetical to both history and theology.
Any claim by the Rabbinical Assembly-or their Reform or Reconstructionist counterparts-of being protected by the First Amendment is therefore both legally and theologically false. Legally, it overlooks the congregational order that organizes American synagogues and their relationships to national bodies. Theologically, it amounts to an effort to deprive local congregations of the very autonomy and self-determination that has fueled the blossoming of diverse Jewish experiences for two thousand years.
V. Conclusion
The Rabbinical Assembly's rules governing its Joint Placement Commission are illegal.
Since the Central Conference of American Rabbis and the Reconstrustionist Rabbinical
Association have developed similar rules governing the placement of pulpit rabbis, those rabbinic organizations are also in violation of the law. Each placement system imposes severe restrictions on the labor market for pulpit rabbis without creating any identifiable procompetitive benefit, and they are outside the protection of the First Amendment. By instituting its placement rules, these rabbinic organizations are acting to advance their own commercial interests to the detriment of the welfare of consumers, namely the congregations and congregants who hire and ultimate benefit from a rabbi's services.
There is much that is troubling about claiming that the First Amendment protects these organizations from Sherman Act scrutiny. First, it reflects an arrogant rejection of the decentralization that has sustained Jewish communities worldwide for nearly two millenniathrough global wars, holy wars, unfriendly host nations, dramatic technological change, and spectacular social change. And second, it invokes the First Amendment to sanitize what is little more than the suppression of religious expression. The First Amendment may not, and ought not, be used to subvert itself. Although the First Amendment does not support a claim against the rabbinic organizations that stifle religious expression, the Sherman Act does. At the very least, the First Amendment should not prevent a claim that would advance its principles.
Permitting the Sherman Act to fulfill its mandate from Congress to promote competition to dislodge entrenched concentrations of power will not only liberate congregations. It also will significantly help non-Orthodox Judaism in America. Were the rabbinical organizations to adopt less restrictive rules that were consistent with the Sherman Act-rules that empower individual communities and defer to the preferences of both congregants and rabbis-it would kindle the passions and empower the dynamism that Jewish communities have shown over time. It also would transform the functions of the national rabbinic organizations over placement, away from an autocratic role and towards a role that supports and assists both its members to find employment and congregations to hire the rabbi that best suits their needs. Doing so would both advance social welfare, consistent with the dictates of the Sherman Act, advance the First Amendment's principles of free expression, and advance the strength and vitality of American Judaism.
